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Context of the mission:  
 
The mission took place between October 25 and November 14, 2004, in Vietnam. Most of the work 
has been done in Hanoi, with a 3-days field trip in a radius of 150 km in the North of Hanoi.  
 
A. Policies adopted to promote FDI 
 
Since the end of the 80’s, attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been a strategic priority in 
Vietnam. A Law on Forest Investment has been promulgated in 1987, and revised several times 
between 1990 and 2003. Many obstacles for FDI have been removed: currency balancing regulations 
has been relaxed, more freedom has been ceded to change investment forms, reorganize enterprises 
and transfer capital. The possibility to carry forward losses has been allowed for a wider range of 
foreign-invested enterprises (FIE), worker recruitment has become freer, the responsibility for 
compensation and land-clearance has shifted from the foreign partner to the Vietnamese side, and FIE 
have been allowed to mortgage their land use rights (under Red Books) to borrow from credit 
organizations (Leproux and Brooks, 2003).  
 
Many FIE can now hire workers directly without the involvement of employment centres, and FIE 
cans set-up export oriented enterprises through simple registration without waiting for discretionary 
approvals. The creation of special industrial zone with facilities for FIE re-exporting their production 
has been cited as a significant incentive for FDI attraction. 
 
Fiscal incentives to FDI 
 
A very important move has been the decentralization of FDI approval and regulations to provincial 
levels. For example, tax rates across all ownership has been standard since 1999; before that, there was 
a differentiation between the State and the non-State sector. After the Tax Laws of 1999, the corporate 
income tax (CIT) was 32% for domestic firms, 25 % for foreign enterprises and the VAT was 10%. 
Recently, Viet Nam’s National Assembly unified corporate taxes: domestic and foreign enterprises 
pay a unified corporate tax of 28%. Provinces have the latitude to modulate the CIT to give foreign 
investors lower rates (figures of 25, 15 and 10% has been given in Ha Tinh Province). Another 
incentive is exemption or reduction of land rent decided at the provincial level. For instance, the 
VIJACHIP Ha Tinh Province (North-Central Vietnam) said they easily got leased land, thanks to their 
relationship with local authorities. 
 
Since 2001, fiscal regime is even more attractive for enterprises located in Industrial Zones (IZ) : 
 
 Export less than 30% 30 to 50% 50 to 80 % More than 80% 
Corporate tax 20% 15% 10% 10% (from the 9th year 
only) 
Exemption period 1 year 2 years* 4 years* 4 years* 
Tax cut 50% for 2 years 50% for 3 years 50% for 4 years 50% for 4 years 
* from the first profitable year 
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Profit transfers abroad are subject to a levy of 3%. 
 
There is another category of special zone, the Export Production Zone (EPZ). In these zones, 100% of 
the production must be exported. Import and export taxes are nil. Enterprises are free to supply from 
the local market, but these goods are considered as exports (for wood chips, 5% the export tax has 
been removed in 2001). The fiscal regime is the same than in IZ (4th column). Many industrial IZ and 
EPF have set up a "one-door " mechanism to simplify procedures for registering and exporting. 
 
Several Wood chip producers and exporters – such as VIJACHIP in Ha Tinh and in Quy Nhan – are 
located in these Export Production Zones or in Industrial Zones.  
 
 
Relevant restrictions still affects, however, the regulations on stake and legal capital in Joint-Ventures 
(JVs) and 100% FIE. Legal capital must be at least 30% of total capital invested (capital invested + 
loans). In some special cases it can be reduced to 20%, but we do not know in what extent forestry 
sector is concerned. Some observers also point out the high cost of doing business in Vietnam, due to 
costs such as international phone calls and, moreover from an export perspective, seaport costs. 
 
What comes also recurrently and is cited as an obstacle is the land issue. There is a obligation for 
foreign investors to rent land on which the enterprise wish to establish, or to reach an agreement with a 
Vietnamese partner who hold the land. The ownership of land is still not possible to foreign investors. 
According to different sources, there is a relative insecurity of land agreement with an unbalance 
between the holder and the enterprise about the duration of rent agreements. 
 
Example of set of incentive provided by local authorities to attract FDI 
• Investment projects in Phu Bai Industrial Zone will enjoy the following privileges: 
• Cost of renting the land with the infrastructure thereon: 0,32USD/m2/a year. 
• To be exempted from cost of renting the land with the infrastructure thereon within 10 
years as from the date of renting the land (calculated at the approved technical design). 
• To be re-supported by the Provincial budget with paid 100% corporate income tax (which 
the provincial budget enjoys) within 05 years to supplement working capital. 
• Investors are supported at maximum 30% training expenses to raise the first professional 
skill or to be re-trained when changing technology lines for direct production workers at 
domestic vocational training centres. 
• Foreign-invested projects in Phu Bai IZ enjoy the tax rate 10% of the privileged corporate 
income tax through the time of implementing the projects and are exempted from the 
above rate within the first four years as from the business of getting profit and reduced 
within next four years. 
• Foreign-invested projects are exempted from import duties for import goods to create fixed 
assets: Machine and equipment, specific means of transport in technology lines and 
means of transport to meet and see off workers (automobiles with more than 24 seats, 
water means of conveyance), construction materials domestically not produced. 
• Foreign-invested projects are exempted from import duties for production materials within 
05 years as from the date of starting production; 
• Foreign-invested projects only pay the tax of transferring profits abroad at the rate of 3% 
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B. Likely impacts of Vietnam integration in free-trade areas 
 
The impact of AFTA’s Vietnam adhesion 
 
Until recently, studies on trade policy underlined a systematic bias in favor of import substitution 
against exports. High import tariffs on several products (such as paper) makes production for the 
domestic market more profitable than for the export market, allowing sales at prices higher than world 
prices, raising prices of goods and making exports less competitive. As a consequence, it was 
suggested that investments were done in sectors where does not have “comparative advantage”.  
 
This assessment is becoming less and less relevant, as Vietnam is on the way of reducing tariffs as a 
consequences of its adhesion to the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) established in July 1992. 
According to the agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT); AFTA accession 
requires that tariffs trade levied on a large range of goods traded within the region be reduced to not 
more 5%. Vietnam signed on to the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme in 1995 
when it committed itself to the region’s biggest organization, ASEAN. Under the CEPT agreement, 
Vietnam would implement AFTA, reducing tariffs on imported products from 30-50 % – 100 % on 
some items – to less than 5 % by 2006. Before undergoing tariff reductions, the paper industry was 
well protected by government policies with tariffs of 40 % on paper imported from Asean countries. 
Since July 1, 2003,  the rates have been reduced to 20 %, making the already cheaper Asean paper 
much cheaper than domestic products. In 2006, tariff on paper imported should be reduced to 5%. 
 
Besides tariffs, quantitative restrictions were in force for products such as paper until 2003, but have 
been removed since then.  
 
According to analysis presented in Vietnamese economic circles, at current prices, Vietnam paper 
costs $877 against $822–842 for ASEAN paper imported (20% tariff and charges included). The paper 
produced by Vietnam mills is still not competitive at economic (world) prices: $685 for ASEAN paper 
(economic price) imported in Vietnam. Current rate of effective protection (linked to difference in 
tariffs on inputs – pulp – and paper) might be around 30-40%, in average. 
But Bai Bang mill produces at $764/T. Assuming a $685 per ton of ASEAN imported papers 
(economic price) and adding a 5% tariff (the rate accepted by Vietnam under CPET from 2006), the 
market price of ASEAN paper could be $720 per ton. Thus, paper produced by Bai Bang factory, 
considered as the most efficient unit in Vietnam, would be priced $40 - 45 above the ASEAN 
imported paper (mainly paper from Indonesia) 
 
No information was available on the potential impact of, expected, Vietnam adhesion to WTO, but one 
could guess AFTA, in which low-cost producers such as Indonesia, are already in, concentrate all the 
trends that could be expected under trade liberalization chock.  
 
Government response endeavors 
 
Vietnamese Govt and economic circles are fully aware of the situation, and are willing to increase Bai 
Bang production capacities to 250,000 T of pulp ($250 M investment) and to 100,000 T of writing and 
printing paper, in order to make new scale economies. But the situation seems critical for other, less 
capitalized, units.  
 
Main weaknesses mentioned are: 
- outdated equipment, lowest quality, small-scale units (473 in paper business, including 
441 non-State) 
- 30,000 workers, but lack of high-skilled 
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Upgrading paper and pulp sector would require $1 billion funding (Vietnam Paper Corporation, VPC, 
source1).  
 
By the end of 2004, the Minister of Industry and Vietnam Paper Association (VPA) declared that 
Vietnamese paper enterprises have not prepared well for its production and trading in the coming 
integration. They will face challenges if they do not restructure their production. VPA recommended 
paper enterprises to stop investment in production of paper but invest more in manufacture of paper 
powder as well as improve skills of workers and apply high technology. Wood chip have not been 
mentioned, but one could considers that it could be seen as a possible outlet for units that would not be 
able to sell paper above their production cost without tariff protection any more. According to the 
recent report of Ministry of Industry, there are many investment in medium/low quality paper 
manufacturing projects. All equipments are the second-hand ones. The capacity of such project is only 
about 10,000 MT/year each plant. The reason of this investment trend is the high demand of low 
quality packaging paper. Raw materials is the recycle paper or wastes. There is also a rational in 
investment in these kind of “niches”, as it is not affected by competition fro outside. 
 
The impact of integration in AFTA is already tangible on the pulp and paper structure: the Kon Tum 
pulp mill, planned to produce 130,000 T has been cancelled (after 5 years of project implementation), 
due to inefficiency. And the Tanh Hoa paper and pulp mill, planned to produce 50,000 T of pulp per 
year and 60,000 T of paper is delayed, and might be actually cancelled2, as is the Bac Kan (50,000 T 
pulp/year planned) which is said “delayed” or “postponed”. As Vietnamese population  growths and 
average individual consumption of paper is still below the regional level (at 13.7 kg per year), paper 
imports continue to climb (increase of 9% in the first half of 2003). 
 
VINAPIMEX is lobbying for an increase in pulp production, to decrease the reliance on pulp imports 
and, in a second step, to meet the domestic demand of paper. One could guess that VINAPIMEX 
might have some support in the Government, as it seems the debate between advocates of import-
substitution, on one hand, and those who are convinced that free-trade will provide much benefits to 
Vietnam than industry protection is not closed. What is also at stake is the institutional structure under 
which the pulp and paper industry will be ruled in the future. A restructuring of the industry is on 
tracks, and one could expect a concentration of pulp and paper industry to create a handful of units 
close to what is considered as critical size in the international market (500,000 T/year of pulp, 
according ADB report). Would it be under the auspices of the State-owned VINAPIMEX or under 
Foreign-Invested companies? 
 
C. The Wood chip production and exports environment 
 
A production structure dominated by Japanese interests 
 
According to the ADB 2000 report, there were 9 plants of Woodchip production in 2000, with an 
aggregated production capacity of 400,000 Bone Dried Tons (BDT) of chips. According to the same 
report, these units were competitive on export markets inasmuch the wood collection does not exceed 
200 km around the plant location.  
 
An USDA report of 2002, mentioned the figure of 16 wood chip plants throughout the country. In its 
2003 report, K. Barney listed 11 units. According to information collected late 2004, this number has 
                                                     
1 The largest producer of paper products is the state-owned VINAPIMEX (Vietnam Paper Corporation), which 
holds 80 percent of the country’s paper production capacity.  
2 Despite the fact that site clearance-ground leveling plans and technical design has been completed, commercial 
banks do not want to provide credit for the project ($10 M requested) because they think that it will have “low 
efficiency in capital recovery”. The project remained paper on the drawing board by the end of 2004, waiting for 
a Govt decision about mandate loans for it. But according to information issued in 2005, the project has been 
simply cancelled. 
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not change from then. – as VIJACHIP Cai Lan, which is producing since March 2004, was already 
listed. 
 
VIJACHIP (Vietnam – Japan Chip Corporation) is the main producer of wood chips established in 
Vietnam. It is a Joint Venture between the Japanese NISSHO IWAI (now SOJITZ Corporation) and 
the VINAFOR, a State-owned company.  
 
The enterprises are: 
 
- VIJACHIP Da Nang, established since 1994, currently producing about 140,000 BDT. 
The plant operates plantations with o total area of 20,000 ha and complement its supply 
with small-farmers production. Nissho Iwai  owns 60% of shares in Vijachip Da Nang, 
and Vinafor the remaining. The unit produce export for export only, to Japan. 
- VIJACHIP Cai Lan, in Ha Long City, open since March 2004. In that JV still with 
Vinafor, Sojitz holds a 51% stake in the $1.5 M initial investment. The plant is estimated 
having a 300,000 BDT wood chip capacity. 
- VIJACHIP Vung Ang (Ha Tinh Province), JV between Nissho Iwai (Sojitz) and Vinafor, 
is established since 2001. VIJACHIP VA has a capital of US$1.5 M, with 60% from 
Nissho Iwai, and 40% for Vinafor. The company's annual processing capacity is 300,000 
tons, and expected sales are $12 M. VIJACHIP VA will export plantation wood chip to 
Japan, providing its total output to Japanese Oji Paper. 
 
- The shareholding of QPFL is slightly different (Quy Nhon Plantation Forest Ltd). This JV 
is a joint investment between Japanese Oji Paper (51%), Nissho Iwai (now Sojitz) (39%) 
and Dai Nippon Printing (10%). QPFL is associated (55% investment) in a JV named 
Binh Dinh Chip Corporation (BDC) with QNVC (Quy Nhon Wood Corporation), a 
Vietnamese company (JV with Pisico and Vyfaco) having invested 45% in that JV. The 
production capacity of BDC is 120,000 BDT per year, a production earmarked  for Oji 
Paper, as the ownership of the woodchip production remains to QPFL (Barney, 2003), i.e. 
to Japanese interests.  
 
QPFL have been granted with 10,000 ha leased from local authorities. The fee paid is 
calculated on the basis on the annual area harvested (AAH) x $10, plus a unit land fee fixed at 
$1 per ha for the full area planted. 
 
SOJITZ aims to increase its production capacities in these JVs by 50% at about 900,000 tons per year. 
The wood chips are exported to Japanese paper manufacturers, including Oji Paper Co.  The Japanese 
company plans to invest 300 million Yen per year to plant acacia tress on 3,000 ha each year, in order 
to reach the target of 21,000 ha planted within 7 years, to cover 2/3 of the raw material need for its 
wood chip production.  
 
Besides VIJACHIP enterprises, K. Barney mentions QNWC, the Vietnamese associate of BDC JV, 
which operate its own wood chip plant (said somewhat outdated) of the same capacity as BDC. In 
2003, QNWC exported woodchip  for about 50-60,000 BDT for Japanese and Taiwanese market. 
Barney estimates that Bin Dinh port would be able to export up to 140 – 160,000 BDT when acacias 
hybrid plantations planted by QPFL (the JV dominated by Japanese interests) will come on line. 
 
Other wood chip facilities 
 
- CAT PHU/ C&P PLANT WOOD CHIP Company, in Nha Trang City (Khan Hoa 
Province) 
According to K. Barney, C&P is a small wood chip producer, probably part of the 
Vietnam-Taiwan (VITAICO) Corporation. The production capacity is around 70,000 
BDT/year, but the enterprise seems to face some difficulties with log supply (2002 
production: 48,000 T). All the production is exported. Barney guess that Japan and Oji 
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Paper is the final destination. The company seems not having its own plantations, and buy 
wood to small-farmers and SFEs. 
 
- SANRIMJOHAP VINA Co. 
This company started in 1994, as a JV between Vietnam and Korea. The production 
capacity of the plant is up to 50,000 BDT/year. In 2003, the company was supplying 50% 
of logs from outside-sources, and planned to reach in 2004 about 70-80 % of the 
production coming from its own plantations. All the exports are targeted to Korea, but 
Japan is viewed an additional potential outlet. The company experienced wood shortage. 
 
- VITAICO (Vietnam-Taiwan Corporation), is said to have 3 to 4 plants, from North to 
South (including perhaps the C&P mentioned above), including Haitaico (Haiphong), and 
another plant under construction in Hue. VITAICO enterprises seems to face serious 
wood supply shortage. 
 
- SFR (Vietnam) is a JV between Hong Kong interests and Vietnam. SFR HQs are in 
Saigon, and the plant is located in Phu Dong, in Dong Nai province. Production capacity 
could be around 120,000 BFT/year. SFR exports to Japan all its production. It sources 
most of its log supply outside, from small-scale farmers through brokers in a radius of 




According to Barney’s document, the FOB price paid by Japanese buyers for BDT of wood chip is 
$70-80, meanwhile Chinese buyers are said to buy at $60 to 65. As the Chinese Yuan has lost 13% 
against the Yen between early 2003 and 2005, it could be suggested that this difference might still be 
in force, even though on could assume that both Japanese and Chinese prices have raised, following 
other international wood chip prices (see below). Thus, Vietnamese exports are mainly going to Japan 
(approx. 540,000 BDT in 2003).  
 
In comparison, Australian wood chip made from eucalyptus was quoted (FOB prices at Australian 
ports) around $80 to 100, in 2003, but with a sharp increase in 2004 with FOB price up to $130, when 
in the meantime Chile, South-Africa and the US experienced FOB prices at $100 (source: Wood 
Resources International, 2004). 
 
Production costs for BDT wood chip were quoted at $77 in 1999 by the ADB study, and between $50 




It has not been possible to get recent statistics on woodchips production and exports in Vietnam. The 
statistics presented below are these from FAO, and are of 2002 (2003 figures are the reproduction of 
the 2002 ones).  
 
Last FAO data available: 
 
Vietnam 2002 2003 
Chips and Particles Production 1,683,000 1,683,000
 Exports (m3) 804,000 804,000




Woodchip and Particles exported by destination 
Year: 2002  M3 $ (thousands) 
Vietnam exports to China 38 8
to Japan 758 136 42 679
to Korea, Republic of 45 826 2 546
to 
Others (adjustment by 
FAO)  0 0
 Total  804 000 45 233
 
The International Trade Center (Geneva), gives figures of the value of the “woodchip and wastes” 




1999 2000 2001 2002 
Value (thsd $) 69  10,286 27,464 27,233 
 
 
D. Institutional issues 
 
Institutional arrangements for production 
 
As noticed by Barney, there are two ways for securing plantation in Vietnam. 
 
- The first one is to rent directly the land to the Vietnamese local authorities. This is the 
case, for instance, of QPFL. But the plantation and the harvest  is done through sub-
contractors who manage the plantation area. And, in the case of QPFL, Vietnamese 
authorities tend to allocate poor quality areas for plantations, with potential disputes with 
local farmers.  
- The second one is to make a JV with a State Forest Enterprise (SFE), which will provide 
the land and hold the responsibility for the plantation – or will sub-contract with farmers 
to get additional logs, as we have seen during our field trip, and brokers play a significant 
role as go-betweens in the process. This arrangement is by far the more easy for foreign 
investors, despite the relative inefficiency of SFEs. As far as the rural land would remain 
not alienable, this arrangement will be the most used for plantations development in 
Vietnam. 
 
However, some difficulties are foreseen for log supply to some wood chip plants which does not get 
their own plantation to produce log. In Southern Vietnam, farmers are said to be looking for 
alternatives to fast growing tree species which generate more incomes.  
 
The issue of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
 
SOEs have been unavoidable partners for past investments in Vietnam. Foreign enterprises had and 
incentive to choose SOEs as partners in establishing Joint-Ventures (JVs) in order to achieve 
administrative and bureaucratic advantages. Local firms were discriminated in that regard. For 
instance, regarding the land use rights, SOEs were allowed to consider them as equity in JVs with 
foreign investors, not the local firms. 
 
SOEs are notoriously inefficient and loss-making. But an important move, in terms of institutional 
arrangements, has been the “new incentive structure” for SOEs. The State Forest Entreprises (SFEs) 
managers met during the field trip in Phu-Tau region, were “waiting for privatisation” (with some 
hope). However, the privatisation process seems to be on tracks for internal working arrangements. 
Wages of workers harvesting logs in company land-owned forest, are no more based on fixed salary – 
as it was the case before 2000 or 200, but all their salaries are, now, piecework (“if they do not work, 
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they are not paid; as manager my responsibility is to provide them with job everyday”). And 
seemingly, this institutional arrangement seems to work (no figure of increase in productivity has been 
given, however), despite it could be considered as paradoxical after several decades of socialist-
oriented government. Nevertheless, the Director of one of the visited SFE confessed that cost norms 
and management rules were still issues not well addressed in the enterprise to improve its efficiency. 
 
Another new institutional arrangement worth to notice, is the change in hierarchical position. In the 
region we enquired, we visited a SFE which was under the authority of VINAFOR (the raw material 
company) . Since recently, the SFE is under the hierarchical dependence of the Bai Bang pulp an paper 
factory. Meetings are organized each month between SFE management and Bai Bang staff to discuss 
of the prices (wood is sold at market price), of the supply constraint, etc.  
 
SFEs represent 3.7 million ha of productive forest, with 3.2 M ha of natural forest and 387.000 ha of 
production plantations. Households are said to control 634.000 ha of forest plantations. The biggers 
SFEs are controlling forest area of 10,000 ha or more. Recently, these SFEs has been pooled in 15 
Forest Production Unions. 
 
Land tenure issue and incentives to farmers 
 
80% of the Vietnamese populations is living in rural areas. The plots are very small: 0.18 ha per 
farmer for agricultural production, and the government targets to increase plots sizes. In the highlands, 
forestry in promoted.  
 
One of the major changes to secure the land tenure has been the Book system from the beginning of 
the 90’s. Agriculture lands (and productive forests) used by farmers can be granted by Red Books, 
giving them exclusive use rights for a 20-years period, and this Red Book can be used as collateral for 
credit and mortgage (there are also Green Books with 50-years rights, but only for conservation 
forest). Transferability of these rights is allowed, but only between farmers in direct use of the fields. 
However, such a clause is bypassed as urban buyers can easily find some farmers to lend their name, 
and concentrate in their hands large amount of land. 
 
There are few incentives for forestry-making, except a 50,000 VD ($3.5) per ha for protection forests. 
The real “incentive” is that for being granted with a Red or a Green book, farmers must participate to 
State Forestry Programmes. 
 
Forestry do represent, however, a realistic option in degraded areas, hills and many uplands, and 
seems considered as so by peasants. Farmers visited in the Phu Tau region (around 120 km from 
Hanoi) were mixing fast growing trees (eucalyptus and acacias) and crops (tea in the uplands). 
Rotations are very short: 3 years for the eucalyptus, the specie farmers seems to prefer due to this 
characteristic. Trees for wood chip making are harvested below 6 cm of diameter. Plantations are very 
tight: about 1,000 stumps per ha (6 cm diameter). Trees are sold to brokers for an average price of 
200,000 VD ($14-15) for wood destined for Bai Bang pulp factory. 
 
 
Likely impact on natural forests 
 
Information collected in Vietnam are not sufficient to provide a wise judgement on that issue. If the 
Pulp and Paper industry would be able to growth according to Government plans, an increase of the 
pressure on natural forests would be likely. But our conclusions challenge this assumption, as we 
shows that the P&P industry will not develop according officials plans (many plants could not 
compete with imported paper and pulp after the removal of protection entailed by free-trade 






Vietnam  adhesion to AFTA – and tomorrow to WTO – is having a considerable impact on Vietnam 
pulp and paper industry. The numerous medium scale units producing papers, operating with outdated 
equipments and making lower quality than ASEAN paper imported in Vietnam, will face severe 
difficulties to remain profitable as the price competition on paper will be severe. As the scope for 
decrease of production costs (trough roads improvements and large-scale plantations) is narrow (see 
JM Roda’s report), it is likely that most of these units comes out of the paper business quite soon. This 
process is already on tracks, with the cancellation of pulp and paper facilities under construction, as 
mentioned in this report. Bai Bang factory make endeavours to reach a critical size in order to be able 
to compete in the new context.  
 
Clearly, the Government master plan to have production units spread throughout the country, in order 
to provide employment and revenues in different provinces, is challenged by Vietnam self-
commitment in a free-trade area such AFTA. One could assume that the future of the Pulp and Paper 
in Vietnam will be with a handful of large units, i.e. one in the North, one or two in the Centre (Da 
Nang?) and one in the South. But this scenario itself is questionable, as the profitability of log supply 
is unlikely when raw material is gathered beyond $7 per ton, corresponding to a 150 – 200 km radius 
around the plant with the current infrastructure conditions (see Roda’s report). Giving the land tenure 
constraints and the rural structure of Vietnam, there are but few opportunities for large-scale 
plantations of fast-growing trees, and sufficient supply of pulp plants might be difficult. A way of 
increasing the “profitability perimeter” of raw materiel gathering would be to enhance the secondary 
road network shape (see Roda’s report). But it does not appears being a short-term priority for 
Vietnamese Government.  
 
Could the wood chip production be a profitable specialization, and does Vietnam have a comparative 
advantage in wood chip exports? Apparently, wood chip production for export seems to be a profitable 
business at present time: Vietnamese FOB prices are lower than Australian hardwood ones, and the 
free-trade agreements does not hit this almost-primary production (first stage of transformation). The 
potential closure or re-orientation toward wood chips of some becoming non-profitable pulp & paper 
enterprises could boost wood chip exports of Vietnam. Japanese investors have utilized the numerous 
incentives provided by Vietnamese authorities to promote export-oriented foreign direct investments 
(special zones with fiscal advantages) and have reached agreements – through Joint Ventures – with 
State Forest Enterprises, which on their side have adopted new working regulations (piecework in 
some of them) compensating somewhat their global in efficiency. Japanese’s Sojitz ambition to 
produce and export 900,000 BDT of wood chips to Japan in the coming years through the 4 
subsidiaries set up in Vietnam seems not beyond reach. But the scope of development is, however, 
limited by the issue of “profitability perimeter” for the logs as raw material for wood chips.  
 
China, so far, is not a significant player as wood chip buyer in Vietnam. The difference of buying 
prices that both Japanese and Chinese can afford is certainly the basic reason for such a situation. Can 
Chinese buyers propose higher prices in the future? For the present time, Yuan is tied to US$, and both 
declines against the Yen, thus the situation is not favourable. Another difficulty could be the 
precedence of Japanese interests in the Vietnamese wood chip business: there is no room for a huge 
development of wood chip production capacities, due to reasons already mentioned. But with China, 
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Annex 1: Terms of Reference of the mission  
 
TERMS OF REFERENCE 
 
TASK 2 – Study on the Impacts of Market and Investment Liberalization on Vietnam’s Pulp 
and Plantations Sector, with Particular Reference to China 
 
CIRAD-Forêt  will analyse the real and anticipated impacts on Vietnam's pulp and plantation sector 
of: a) market and investment liberalization within Vietnam; b) the growth of China's domestic wood 
pulp industry; and c) China's entry into the World Trade Organization. 
 
Specifically, the study will: 
 
1) Document the policies adopted by the Vietnamese government in recent years to promote foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in Vietnam and to orient its own economy towards export markets, and assess 
what these are likely to mean for the country's forestry sector; 
 
2) Assess what the projected growth of wood pulp production in southern China (i.e. Hainan, 
Guangdong, Guangxi), as documented by CIFOR, is likely to mean for wood chip exports from 
Vietnam.  
 
This will include:  
• assessment of whether Vietnames wood chip suppliers are likely to sell increased volumes to 
Japanese, Korean and/or Taiwanese chip buyers due to their displacement from China, as a 
result of China's chip production being redirected to domestic producers as they come online;   
• documentation of whether Chinese companies are now seeking to purchase wood chips from 
Vietnam, and if so, from what sources and in what volumes; 
• description of the dynamics of competition within Vietnam between Chinese companies and 
wood chip buyers from other countries, and assessment of whether there are discernibly 
different strategies employed by the various companies.  
 
3) Document the institutional structures through which wood chip exports from Vietnam are being 
organized, -- i.e. do they involve investments in plantations by the buyers, or only purchases of logs at 
the chipping site? do they involve short-term or long-term contracts? how are prices set? who controls 
transport and shipping? 
 
4) Assess the likely impacts of China's entry into the WTO on Vietnam's forestry sector, and document 
what steps policymakers in Vietnam are taking in anticipation of this development. 
 
5) Briefly analyse what these processes are likely to mean in terms of pressure on natural forests and 




CIRAD-Forêt will deliver the following outputs: 
 
• Descriptive and analytic report, in English, as described above;  
• Hard copies and/or electronic copies of all data, reports, and materials obtained during 
the study; 
• CD including excel database entailing all relevant trade and industry structure data 
covered in the analysis ; 
• PowerPoint presentation summarizing the study’s main findings, in English.   
 
